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Abstract. This paper connects information with computation and cognition via 
concept of agents that appear at variety of levels of organization of physi-
cal/chemical/cognitive systems – from elementary particles to atoms, mole-
cules, life-like chemical systems, to cognitive systems starting with living cells, 
up to organisms and ecologies. In order to obtain this generalized framework, 
concepts of information, computation and cognition are generalized. In this 
framework, nature can be seen as informational structure with computational 
dynamics, where an (info-computational) agent is needed for the potential in-
formation of the world to actualize. Starting from the definition of information 
as the difference in one physical system that makes a difference in another 
physical system – which combines Bateson and Hewitt’s definitions, the argu-
ment is advanced for natural computation as a computational model of the dy-
namics of the physical world, where information processing is constantly going 
on, on a variety of levels of organization. This setting helps us to elucidate the 
relationships between computation, information, agency and cognition, within 
the common conceptual framework, with special relevance for biology and ro-
botics.  
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Introduction 
At present we are lacking adequate understanding of cognition in humans (which is 
what is commonly thought of as “cognition”) while at the same time we are trying to 
develop cognitive robotics and cognitive computing. The contemporary research into 
artifactual cognition performed in parallel with studies of cognition in humans and 
animals provide us with two-way learning that will result in both better insights in 
mechanisms of biological cognition and better solutions for cognitive robotics.  
In order to study within one framework cognition in living organisms (including 
humans) and machines (including cognitive software), this article is generalizing 
some common ideas, thus using extended concepts of <agent>, <observer>, <infor-
mation>, <computation>, <evolution>, <cognition>, <learning>, and <knowledge>. 
The basis is the idea of nature as a network of networks of <agents> that exchange 
 information. This generalized type of <agents> exist on the level of fundamental par-
ticles, then on the higher level of atoms as composed of networks of elementary parti-
cles, then higher still there are molecules consisting of atoms as agents. Up in hierar-
chy of levels of organization of agents there are cells as networks of molecules, or-
ganisms as networks of cells, ecologies as networks of organisms, etc. In short there is 
a fractal structure of agents within agents on variety of levels of organization. Dynam-
ics on each level of organization is a result of information exchanges between agents. 
<Information> is relational, based on differences, and thus <agent>-dependent. 
<Agents> are entities capable of acting on their own behalf (elementary particles, 
atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, etc.) <Computation> is a process of <infor-
mation> exchange between <agents>, i.e. <information> dynamics or processes on 
informational structures (Hewitt 2012).  
Epistemology is formulated as theory of information (Chaitin 2007), or more spe-
cifically as theory of informational structures (Floridi 2008)(Sayre 1976) in <cogni-
tive> agents. Even though informational structural realism is formulated from the 
perspective of human agents, it is readily generalizable to any other kind of agents 
processing information from the outside world that guides their organization and be-
havior.  
In this generalized framework, agents exist already on a basic physical level, and 
they form, via processes of self-organization, increasingly complex structures, includ-
ing living organisms. Living <agents> (all biological systems) are critically dependent 
on the capability to acquire energy for their own <agency>. Their <cognition> is a 
property that ensures and governs their process of being alive. Understanding of liv-
ing <agency> is closely tied to the understanding of origins of life and its evolution.  
In present approach we look at evolution as a process that unfolds through morpho-
logical <computation>, through morphogenesis and meta-morphogenesis as intro-
duced in (Turing 1952) and further studied in (Sloman 2013a) and (Dodig-Crnkovic 
2012d). At different levels of complexity of living <agents>, different levels of <cog-
nitive> information-processing capacities develop – from bacterial colonies with dis-
tributed information processing (Xavier et al. 2011) via plants to organisms with 
nervous systems such as C. elegans (See OpenWorm project 
http://www.openworm.org that is building the computational model of this micro-
scopic worm) to mammals and finally humans. Organisms preserve evolutionary 
memory in their body structures, that in interaction with the environment exhibit dif-
ferent behaviors. From biological structures as information-processing mechanisms 
we can hope to learn more not only about the details of form generation (morphogen-
esis) in biological systems, but also about possible future computational methods and 
devices inspired by intrinsic natural computation. A lot can be learned from infor-
mation processing in the brain. 
 “The uniformity of the cortical architecture and the ability of functions to move to 
different areas of cortex following early damage strongly suggests that there is a 
single basic learning algorithm for extracting underlying structure from richly-
structured, high- dimensional sensory data.” (Hinton 2006) (Italics added)  
Based on the uniformity of cortical architecture, Deep Learning Algorithms have 
been recently developed as machine learning algorithms using artificial neural net-
 works that learn in a succession of levels corresponding to increasing levels of ab-
straction of concepts, with higher-level concepts defined in terms of lower-level ones; 
typically used for pattern recognition (Hinton et al. 2006)1 (Hawkins & Blakeslee 
2005)  
Similarly, based on the behavior of natural systems, Probably Approximately Cor-
rect “PAC” algorithms (Valiant 2013) have been proposed as a way of learning from 
nature how to learn. The scope of PAC algorithms is wider than the scope of Deep 
Learning Algorithms as they offer in general "the unified study of the mechanisms of 
evolution, learning, and intelligence using the methods of computer science". Valiant 
argues that "to understand the fundamental character of life, learning algorithms are 
good place to start.”  
While both PAC algorithms and Deep Learning are centered on machine learning, 
notwithstanding the fact that Valiant makes important connection between (machine) 
learning algorithms and evolution, I introduced a different path searching for ground-
ing of learning in the mechanisms of <cognition> starting with simplest living organ-
isms like bacteria whose processing of information is form of natural computation. 
Within the framework of info-computationalism, I proposed the unified view of com-
puting nature with <agent>-based fundamental notions of <information> and <com-
putation> (information exchanges between <agents>). (Hewitt 2012) especially fo-
cused on interaction and mechanisms of computation as discussed in (Dodig-
Crnkovic & Giovagnoli 2013). In this approach it is essential that both informational 
structures and computational processes appear on variety of levels of organization 
(levels of abstraction).  
This naturalist strategy aims at explaining human cognitive capacities as a result of 
evolutionary and developmental processes that we want to model and simulate in 
order to be able to both better understand humans and other living organisms, how 
they function and what causes their malfunctions, as well as to learn how to build 
intelligent computational artifacts that will add to our extended cognition. 
Nature as Info-Computation for a Cognizing Agent2 
In this article I will propose a framework with the aim to naturalize cognition, 
meaning that we will not study the concept of cognition but <cognition> as natural 
phenomenon in any kind of living <agent>. The framework of info-computationalism, 
presented earlier in (Dodig-Crnkovic 2012a)(Dodig-Crnkovic & Giovagnoli 2012) 
(Dodig-Crnkovic & Müller 2011) (Dodig-Crnkovic 2006) is based on concepts of 
<information> and <computation> as two fundamental and mutually dependent con-
cepts defined in a broader sense than what one typically is used to.  
                                                            
1 The deep learning model (Hinton et al. 2006) involves learning the distribution of a high level 
representation using a restricted Boltzmann machine to model each higher layer. 
(Smolensky 1986) 
2 Some of the issues discussed here have been discussed by the author in a recent book Compu-
ting Nature and in the book Information and Computation. This paper presents a synthesis of 
the previously developed arguments. 
 Information is understood according to informational structural realism (Floridi 
2003) (Floridi 2009)(Floridi 2008)(Sayre 1976) as the structure, the fabric of the rela-
tionships in the universe (for an agent).  
Computation is defined as information processing (Burgin 2010) and presents all 
processes of changes of the structures of the universe3 (natural computationalism or 
pancomputationalism) (Zuse 1969, Fredkin 1992, Wolfram 2002, Lloyd 2006, Chaitin 
2007)4.  
Combining the ideas of informational structural realism and natural computational-
ism results in the model of the universe as a huge computational network where com-
putation is understood as the dynamics of natural information, i.e. natural computa-
tion (Rozenberg et al. 2012). Computing nature represents all processes existing in the 
physical universe, which necessarily appear in both discrete and continuous form, on 
both symbolic and sub-symbolic5 level.  
From now on, given the above non-standard definitions I will omit brackets around 
<agent>, <information>, <computation>, <cognition> etc. and I hope the reader will 
keep in mind generalized notions that are used in the rest of the article. 
A consequence for epistemology for an agent processing information is that infor-
mation and reality are seen as one by an agent (Zeilinger 2005) (Vedral 2010), not 
only in case of humans, but also for other living organisms as cognizing agents. 
(Maturana & Varela 1992) (Ben-Jacob et al. 2011) (Shapiro 2011) 
The Relational Nature of Information and Levels of Organization 
The world exists independently from cognizing agents (realist position of structural 
realism) in the form of proto-information/potential information, the potential form of 
existence corresponding to Kant’s das Ding an sich. That proto-information becomes 
actual information (“a difference that makes a difference” according to (Bateson 
1972)) for a cognizing agent in a process of interaction through which aspects of the 
world get uncovered/registered6.  
Hewitt proposed the following general relational7 definition that subsumes 
Bateson’s definition:  
                                                            
3 This “processing” can be either intrinsic (spontaneously going on) for any physical system or 
designed such as in computing machinery. 
4 For majority of computationalists, computing nature is performing discrete computation. Zuse 
for example represents his calculating space as cellular automata, but the assumption about 
the type of computation is not essential for the idea that the universe <computes> its next 
state from the previous one. 
5 Sub-symbolic computations go on in neural networks, as signal processing which leads to 
concept formation from pattern recognition. 
6 The expression ”registered” is borrowed from Brian Cantwell Smith (Cantwell Smith 1998) 
7 More on current understanding of information can be found in the Handbook of the Philoso-
phy of Information (Benthem van & Adriaans 2008) 
 ”Information expresses the fact that a system is in a certain configuration that is 
correlated to the configuration of another system. Any physical system may con-
tain information about another physical system.” (Hewitt 2007) (Italics added)  
Bateson’s definition follows from the above formulation if “another system” is an 
observer for whom the difference in the first system makes a difference. This rela-
tional view of information has consequences for epistemology and connects to the 
ideas of participatory universe (Wheeler 1990), endophysics (Rössler 1998) and ob-
server-dependent knowledge production of second-order cybernetics. Combining 
Bateson and Hewitt insights, on the basic level, information is the difference in one 
physical system that makes a difference in another physical system, thus constituting 
correlation between their configurations.  
Among correlated systems, of special interest in our discussion of naturalized cog-
nition are agents - systems able to act on their own behalf, and among agents we will 
focus on living agents, that is cognizing agents, based on Maturana and Varela’s un-
derstanding that life is identical with cognition8 (Maturana & Varela 1980). In what 
follows, it should become evident why it is so that all living agents possess some 
degree of cognition. 
The world as it appears (actualizes) for cognizing agents depends on the types of 
interactions through which they acquire information. Potential information in the 
world is obviously much richer than what we observe, containing invisible worlds of 
molecules, atoms and sub-atomic phenomena, distant objects and similar. Our 
knowledge about this potential information which reveals with help of scientific in-
struments continuously increases with the development of new devices and the new 
ways of interaction, through both theoretical and material constructs (Dodig-Crnkovic 
& Müller 2011).  
For an agent, potential information actualizes in present time to transform into po-
tential again. Transformations between potential and actual information (information 
process, computation) parallel transformation between potential and kinetic energy. 
Kampis’ component systems (described later on) model information processing in the 
cell that undergoes cycles of transformations of potential (original informational 
structure) and actual (current process) in creating new informational structure that is 
potentiality for a new process. Notions of potentiality and actuality can be traced back 
to Aristotle, for whom potentiality presents a possibility, while actuality is the 
change/activity/motion/process that presents realization of that possibility. This rela-
tionship parallels being and becoming. Along Aristotle’s transitions from potentiality 
to actuality, we discuss even the transition from actuality to potentiality, closing the 
cycle of transformations. That would correspond the cycle from original structure 
(information) via dynamical process (computation) to a new structure (information). 
                                                            
8 Even though Maturana and Varela identify process of life with cognition, Maturana refuses 
the information processing view of cognition. It should be noted that it is based on tradition-
al concept of information. 
 The Hierarchy of Levels of Natural Information 
This article provides arguments for the new kind of understanding, in the sense of 
(Wolfram 2002), of lawfulness in the organization of nature and especially living 
systems, emergent from generative computational laws of self-organization based on 
the concept of agents. In order to understand the world, organization of the parts in 
the wholes and interactions between them are crucial. That is where generative pro-
cesses come in such as self-organization (Kauffman 1993) (that acts in all physical 
systems), and autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela 1980) (that acts in living cells).  
Self-organization and autopoiesis is effectively described by agent-based models, 
such as actor model of computation (Hewitt 2012) that we adopt. Given that processes 
in the cell run in parallel, the current models of parallel computation (including Bool-
ean networks, Petri nets, Interacting state machines, Process calculi etc.) need to ad-
just to modelling of biological systems (Fisher & Henzinger 2007).  
Interesting framework for information processing in living systems is proposed by 
Deacon (2011) who distinguishes between the following three levels of natural infor-
mation (for an agent): 
− Information 1 (Shannon) (data, pattern, signal) (data communication) [syntax] 
− Information 2 (Shannon + Boltzmann) (intentionality, aboutness, reference, repre-
sentation, relation to object or referent) [semantics]  
− Information 3 ((Shannon + Boltzmann) + Darwin) (function, interpretation, use, 
pragmatic consequence) [pragmatics] 
Deacon’s three levels of information organization parallel his three formative mecha-
nisms: [Mass-energetic [Self-organization [Self-preservation (semiotic)]]] with corre-
sponding levels of emergent dynamics: [Thermo- [Morpho- [Teleo-dynamics]]] and 
matching Aristotle’s causes: [Efficient cause [formal cause [final cause]]]. 
 “Because there are no material entities that are not also processes, and because 
processes are defined by their organization, we must acknowledge the possibility 
that organization itself is a fundamental determinant of physical causality. At dif-
ferent levels of scale and compositionality, different organizational possibilities 
exist. And although there are material properties that are directly inherited from 
lower-order component properties, it is clear that the production of some forms of 
process organization is only expressed by dynamical regularities at that level. So 
the emergence of such level-specific forms of dynamical regularity creates the 
foundation for level-specific forms of physical influence.” (Deacon 2011) p. 177. 
In the above passage, Deacon expresses the same view that we argue for: matter pre-
sents a structure, while causality determines the dynamics of the structure (that we 
interpret as computation). 
In sum, the basic claim of this article is that nature computes through information 
processes going on in networks of agents, hierarchically organized in layers. Informa-
tional structures self-organize through intrinsic processes of natural embodied compu-
tation, as presented in the Introduction to (Dodig-Crnkovic & Giovagnoli 2013). 
 The Hierarchy of Levels of Physical Computation 
If the whole of nature computes, this computation happens on many different lev-
els of organization of the physical matter. In (Burgin and Dodig-Crnkovic 2011) three 
generality levels of computations are introduced, from the most general to the most 
specific/particular one, namely computation defined as: 
1. Any transformation of information and/or information representation. This 
leads to natural computationalism in its most general form. 
2. A discrete transformation of information and/or information representation. 
This leads to natural computationalism in the Zuse and Wolfram form with 
discrete automata as a basis. 
3. Symbol manipulation. This is Turing model of computation and its equivalents. 
There are also spatial levels or scales of computations (Burgin & Dodig-Crnkovic 
2013):  
1. The macrolevel that includes computations performed by current computation-
al systems in global computational networks and physical computations of 
macro-objects. 
2. The microlevel that includes computations performed by integrated circuits. 
3. The nanolevel that includes computations performed by fundamental parts that 
are not bigger than a few nanometers. The molecular level includes computa-
tions performed by molecules. 
4. The quantum level includes computations performed by atoms and subatomic 
particles. 
For more details see (Burgin & Dodig-Crnkovic 2013) which present the current 
state of the art on typologies of computation and computational models. By systema-
tization of existing models and mechanisms, the article outlines a basic structural 
framework of computation.  
Computation on Submolecular Levels 
In Hewitt’s model of computation, Actors are the universal primitives of concurrent 
distributed digital computation. In response to a message that it receives, an Actor can 
make local <decisions>, create more Actors, send more messages, and choose how to 
respond to the next message received. 
“In the Actor Model (Hewitt et al. 1973) (Hewitt 2010), computation is conceived 
as distributed in space, where computational devices communicate asynchronously 
and the entire computation is not in any well-defined state. (An Actor can have in-
formation about other Actors that it has received in a message about what it was 
like when the message was sent.) Turing's Model is a special case of the Actor 
Model.” (Hewitt 2012) 
 The above Hewitt’s “computational devices” are conceived as computational agents – 
informational structures capable of acting on their own behalf. 
For Hewitt, Actors become Agents only when they are able to process expressions 
for commitments including Contracts, Announcements, Beliefs, Goals, Intentions, 
Plans, Policies, Procedures, Requests and Queries. In other words, Hewitt’s Agents 
are human-like or if we broadly interpret the above capacities, life-like Actors. How-
ever, we take all Hewitt’s Actors to be <agents> with different competences as we are 
interested in a common framework encompassing all living and artifactual agents.  
The advantage of Hewitt’s model is that unlike other models of computation that 
are based on mathematical logic, set theory, algebra, etc. the Actor model is based on 
physics, especially quantum physics and relativistic physics. (Hewitt 2012) Its rela-
tional nature makes it especially suitable for modeling informational structures and 
their dynamics. 
Quantum-physical objects such as elementary particles of Standard Model, inter-
acting through gauge bosons as force carriers (mediating the strong, weak, and elec-
tromagnetic interactions) can be modeled as actors exchanging messages. The <agen-
cy> in simplest physical systems such as elementary particles is exactly their physical 
capacity to act, to interact and to undergo changes.  
Within the framework of info-computationalism, nature is informational structure – 
a succession of levels of organization of information for an agent. Of course, this 
reality is different for different agents. Physical reality, das Ding an sich exists as 
potential information that actualizes for an agent through interactions. This leads to 
understanding proposed by Von Baeyer in his book Information: The New Language 
of Science argues that (Baeyer von 2004) who states that “information is going to 
replace matter as the primary stuff of the universe, providing a new basic framework 
for describing and predicting reality”.  
Info-computational approach is supported by the current work in physicists on re-
formulating physics in terms of information, such as proposed by (Goyal 2012) in  
“Information Physics—Towards a New Conception of Physical Reality” and 
(Chiribella et al. 2012) in “Quantum Theory, Namely the Pure and Reversible Theory 
of Information”. For the case of Statistical Thermodynamics based on information (or 
rather lack of information) instead of entropy, see (Ben-Naim 2008). 
Very simple systems can act as <observers> as described in (Matsuno & Salthe 
2011) who present possible approach to naturalizing contextual meaning in the case 
of chemical affinity as material agency. 
However, if we want tools to manipulate physical systems, such as molecules in 
the case of studies of origins of life, our tools must be more than theoretical models – 
they will be computations “in materio” as Stepny (Stepney 2008) called them, argu-
ing aptly: “We are still learning how to use all those tools, both mathematical models 
of dynamical systems and executable computational models and currently developing 
'computation in materio'.“ That is the reason why physical/natural computing is so 
important. 
Molecular Computation, Self-Organization and Morphogenesis 
Both intrinsic or natural morphogenesis and designed/synthetic/artificial morpho-
genesis are instructive in the study of evolution and development as computational 
 processes. At present, according to MacLennan “One of the biggest issues that em-
bodied computation faces is the lack of a commonly accepted model of computation.” 
(MacLennan 2010) As morphogenesis seems to have “the characteristics of a coordi-
nated algorithm” it is of special interest to understand communication patterns of 
actors in a network that represents system with morphogenetic dynamics.  
”By investigating embryological morphogenesis – a supremely successful example 
of what we want to accomplish – we can learn many lessons about how communi-
cation, control, and computation can be done well at very small scales.” 
(MacLennan 2010) 
In the development of an organism, based on the DNA code together with epige-
netic control mechanisms, body of a living being is created through morphogenesis 
governing a short time scale formation of life. On a long-time scale, morphological 
computing governs evolution of species. The environment provides a physical source 
of biological body of an organism, as a source of energy and matter for its metabolism 
as well as information, which governs its behavior. Nervous system and the brain of 
an organism have evolved gradually through interactions (computational processes) of 
simpler living agents with the environment. This process is a result of information 
self-structuring (Dodig-Crnkovic 2008).  
The environment provides an agent with a variety of inputs in the form of infor-
mation and matter-energy, where the difference between information and matter-
energy is not in kind, but in type of use that organism makes of it. As there is no in-
formation without representation, (Landauer 1991) (Allo 2008) all information is 
carried by some physical carrier (light, sound, chemical molecules, etc.). The same 
object can be used by an organism as a source of information and a source of nour-
ishment/matter/energy. Some organisms use light signals just as information neces-
sary for orientation in the environment, while other organisms use it for photosynthet-
ic processes in their metabolism. Thus the question what will be used “only” as in-
formation and what as food/ energy source depends on the type of organism/agent. In 
general, the simpler the organism, the simpler the information structures of its body, 
the simpler information carriers it relies on, and simpler interactions with the envi-
ronment. In that sense 
“(B)iotic information is nothing more than the constraints that allows a living or-
ganism to harness energy from its environment to propagate its organization.” 
(Kauffman et al. 2008) 
According to (Maturana & Varela 1980) p. 78, an autopoetic “machine” is organized 
as a network of processes of production, transformation and destruction of compo-
nents, which through mutual interactions continuously regenerate the network that 
produced them. Structural coupling with the environment for autopoetic systems is 
described as continuous dynamical process and considered as an elementary form of 
cognition possessed by all life forms. 
We describe cognition as information processing in living organisms, from cellular 
to organismic level and up to a social cognition. In this framework information is a 
 substance, computation is a process and we argue for inseparability of struc-
ture/substance and its dynamics/process. If we search for the source of the energy 
necessary to build the constraints and turn environmental energy into the work needed 
by organisms to run their metabolism, Ulanowicz’s process ecology model offers an 
explanation: “Basically the answer is simply that an aleatoric9 event took place in 
which a constraint emerged that allowed a collection of organic molecules to do the 
work necessary to propagate their organization.” (Ulanowicz, 2009)  
(Bonsignorio 2013) studies evolutionary self-structuring of embodied cognitive 
networks and proposes a framework for the modeling of networks of self-organizing, 
embodied cognitive agents that can be used for the design of artificial and ’reverse 
engineering’ of natural networks, based on the maximization of mutual information.  
Biological systems are networks of interacting parts exchanging information. They 
are shaped by physical constraints, which also present information for a system, as 
argued in (Kauffman et al. 2008). A living agent is a special kind of <computational> 
actor that can reproduce and that is capable of undergoing at least one thermodynamic 
work cycle. (Kauffman 2000) 
Kauffman’s definition (that we adopt) differs from the common belief that (living) 
agency requires beliefs and desires, unless we ascribe some primitive form of <be-
lief> and <desire> even to a very simple living agents such as bacteria. The fact is 
that they act on some kind of <memory> and <anticipation> and according to some 
<preferences> that might be automatic in a sense that they directly derive from the 
organisms’ morphology. (Ben-Jacob 2009; Ben-Jacob 2008; Ben-Jacob et al. 2011) 
Nevertheless bacteria show clear preferences for behaviors that increase organism’s 
survival. 
Although the agents capacity to perform work cycles and so persist in the world is 
central and presents the material basis of life, as (Kauffman, 2000) and (Deacon, 
2007) have argued, a detailed physical account of it remains to be worked out, espe-
cially relevant is the abiogenesis. Present article is primarily focused on the info-
computational aspects of life as cognitive process with its basic elements information 
and computation on different levels of organization of living systems.  
Self-organization and Autopoiesis 
In order to understand cognition as a natural phenomenon, and reconstruct the origins, 
development and evolution of life, ideas of self-organisation and autopoiesis are cen-
tral.  
The concept of self-organisation was introduced in general systems theory in the 
1960s, and during the 1970s and 1980s in complex systems. Prigogine (Prigogine & 
Stengers 1984) studied the self-organisation in thermodynamic systems far from equi-
librium, which showed an ability of non-living matter to self-organize when energy is 
provided from the environment that is used for self-organization. This process of self-
organization is what we will describe in subsequent chapters as a form of morphoge-
netic/ morphological computing.  
                                                            
9 Characterized by chance or indeterminate elements, Merriam-Webster online dictionary 
 Unlike Newtonian laws of motion, which describe inert matter that opposes any 
change of its state of motion, self-organizing matter is active and spontaneously 
changes. The ability of inanimate matter (chemicals) to self organize has been studied 
in detail by Kauffman (Kauffman 1995; Kauffman 1993). It has inspired research into 
the origins of life connecting the self-organisation of chemical molecules with the 
autopoiesis in living beings. Self-organization as fundamental natural process ongoing 
in all forms of physical systems provides mechanisms for autopoiesis characteristic 
for living organisms.   
For our understanding of life as cognition, the work of Maturana and Varela on the 
understanding of basic processes and organization of life is fundamental. They define 
the process of autopoiesis of a living system as follows:  
 An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network 
of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which:  
(i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate 
and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and  
 
(ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization 
as such a network. (Maturana & Varela 1980) p. 78 (emphasis added) 
As argued in (Dodig-Crnkovic 2014) p. 7, biological systems change their struc-
tures and thereby the information processing patterns in a self-reflective, recursive 
manner through autopoietic processes with structural coupling (interactions with the 
environment) (Maturana & Varela 1992) (Maturana & Varela 1980). Yet, self-
organisation with natural selection of organisms, as a basis for information that living 
systems build up in their genotypes and phenotypes, is a costly method of <learning> 
by adapting bodily structures. Higher organisms (which are “more expensive” to 
evolve) have evolutionary developed a capability of learning via nervous systems that 
enable flexible memory with capacity of reasoning as a more efficient way to accu-
mulate knowledge about the world. The transition from “genetic learning” (typical of 
more primitive forms of life) to the cognitive skills on higher levels of organisation of 
the nervous system balances the high “production cost” for increasingly complex 
organisms.  
Maturana and Varela argue that the autopoietic process of self-constitution of life 
is the most fundamental cognitive process. 
Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cog-
nition. This statement is valid for all organisms, with or without a nervous sys-
tem.” (Maturana & Varela 1980) p. 13, emphasis added. 
In the info-computational formulation, the process of “life as cognition” (Maturana 
2002; Maturana & Varela 1992; Maturana & Varela 1980; Maturana 1970) corre-
sponds to information processing in the hierarchy of levels of organisation, from mo-
 lecular networks, to cells and their organizations, to organisms and their net-
works/societies (Dodig-Crnkovic 2008).  
Thus the fundamental level proto-information (potential information) corresponds 
to the physical structure, the fabric of reality for an agent, while cognition is a process 
that unfolds in real time as information self-structuring driven by interactions (mor-
phological computing). It develops on a long-time scale (meta-morphogenesis) as a 
product of evolution in complex biological systems, as argued in (Sloman 2013b) 
(Dodig-Crnkovic & Hofkirchner 2011).  
In short, the information-processing model of organisms incorporates basic ideas 
of self-organization and autopoiesis, from the sub-cellular to the multi-cellular, organ-
ismic and societal levels. Being cognitive, life processes present different sorts of 
morphological computing which on evolutionary time scales affect the organisation 
(structures) of living beings even in a sense of meta-morphogenesis (i.e. morphogene-
sis of morphogenesis), (Sloman 2013a).  
Morphological Computing in Component Systems -“Computing in Materio” 
Living organisms are described by Kampis as self-modifying systems that must be 
modeled as self-referential, self-organizing "component-systems" (Kampis 1991) 
which are self-generating and self-sustaining (autopoietic) and whose behavior, 
though computational in a general sense, is more general than Turing machine model. 
“a component system is a computer which, when executing its operations (soft-
ware) builds a new hardware.... [W]e have a computer that re-wires itself in a 
hardware-software interplay: the hardware defines the software and the software 
defines new hardware. Then the circle starts again.” (Kampis 1991) p. 223 
Living systems are modular and organized in a hierarchy of levels that can be under-
stood as a result of propagation of information (Kauffman et al. 2008). A detailed 
account of the present state of the art of hierarchy of levels/layers can be found in 
(Salthe 2012a)(Salthe 2012b). Within info-computational framework, levels are in-
formational structure with specific computational modes (intrinsic computation). 
An example of a simple biological (component) system, studied in terms of infor-
mation and computation is given in (Xavier et al. 2011) in the following way: 
“Thus, each bacterium must be able to sense and communicate with other units in 
the colony to perform its task in a coordinated manner. The cooperative activities 
carried out by members of the colony generate a social intelligence, which allows 
the colony to learn from their environment. In other words, bacterial intelligence 
depends on the interpretation of chemical messages and distinction between inter-
nal and external information. Then a colony can be viewed as a system that ana-
lyzes contextual information from its environment, generates new information and 
retrieves information from the past.” 
 This agrees with the results of Ben-Jacob (Ben-Jacob 2009; Ben-Jacob 2008; Ben-
Jacob et al. 2011). Talking about grand challenges in the research of natural compu-
ting (Nunes de Castro et al. 2011) and (Maldonado & Gómez Cruz n.d.) identify the 
central aim of this field to unveil and harness the above information processes as nat-
ural computation.  
Cognition as Cellular Morphological Computation 
The origin of <cognition> in first living agents is not well researched, as the idea 
still prevails that only humans possess cognition and knowledge. However, as we 
have seen in the previous sections, there are different types of <cognition> and we 
have good reasons to ascribe simpler kinds of <cognition> to other living beings. 
Bacteria “sense the environment and perform internal information processing (ac-
cording to the internally stored information) to extract latent information embedded 
in the complexity of their environment. The latent information is then converted into 
usable or “active” information that affects the bacterium activity as well as intracel-
lular changes.” (Ben-Jacob 2009) Plants as well can be said to possess memory (in 
their bodily structures) and ability to learn (adapt, change their morphology) and can 
be argued to possess simple forms of cognition. (Pombo, O., Torres J.M., Symons J. 
2012) 
As already mentioned, autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela 1980) is considered to be 
the most fundamental level of cognition that is present even in the simplest living 
organisms. Through evolution, increasingly complex organisms have developed that 
are able to survive and adapt to their environment. Organisms are able to register 
inputs (data) from the environment, to structure those into information, and to struc-
ture information into knowledge. The evolutionary advantage of using structured, 
component-based approaches such as data – information – knowledge is based on 
improved response-time and efficiency of cognitive processes of an organism (Dodig-
Crnkovic 2008). 
All cognition is embodied – from microorganisms to humans and cognitive robots. 
In more complex cognitive agents, knowledge is built upon not only direct reaction to 
input information, but also on information processes governed by agents own choices, 
dependent on value systems stored and organized in agent’s memory. 
Information and its processing are essential structural and dynamic elements which 
characterize structuring of input data (as the succession data → information → 
knowledge → data etc.) by an interactive natural computational process going on in 
an agent during the adaptive interplay with the environment. Not all information po-
tentially available is part of cognitive process of an agent. For fungi, written content 
of a book presents no information, but they may use a book as a source of energy 
(food), that is a basis of information-dynamics for their own bodily structures. Simi-
larly, sunlight triggers just energy production by photosynthesis in plants while in a 
human it can trigger the reflection about the nuclear fusion in the sun. 
There is a continuum of morphological development from simplest living organ-
ism’s automaton-like structures to most complex life forms elaborate interplay be-
tween body, nervous system with brain and the environment. Cognition thus proceeds 
through restructuring of an agent in the interaction with the environment where this 
restructuring can be identified as morphological computing. From bacteria, that or-
 ganize in colonies and swarms via more complex multi-cellular organisms and finally 
humans, cells as the basic cognitive units present the basis for a distributed process of 
cognition that in vertebrates is dominated (but not exclusively performed) by the 
nervous system.  
Summary and Conclusions 
To conclude, let me sum up the main points. Firstly, it is important to emphasize 
that info-computational approach relies on naturalist methods and scientific results 
and even though it assigns <cognitive> capabilities to all living beings, those capaci-
ties correspond to empirically established behaviors of biological systems (Ben-Jacob 
2008). Thus, it has no connection to panpsychism, that is the view that mind or soul 
fills everything that exists. Info-computationalism is strictly naturalistic understanding 
based on physics, chemistry and biology and does not make any assumptions about 
things like a “mind of an electron”. Exactly the opposite, it aims at explaining cogni-
tion, and subsequently mind, through entirely natural processes going on in physi-
cal/chemical/biological systems of sufficient complexity.  
In general, naturalization is the ideal of this project: naturalization of information, 
computation, cognition, agency, intelligence, etc. 
Shortly, within the info-computational framework we start with the following ba-
sics elements: 
<Information> is a structure consisting of differences in one system that cause the 
difference in another system. In other words, <information> is < observer>-relative. 
This definition is a synthesis of Bateson and Hewitt definitions. 
<Computation> is <information> processing (dynamics of <information>). 
Both <information> and <computation> appear on different levels of organization/ 
or abstraction/resolution/granularity of matter/energy in space/time. 
Of all <agents>, i.e. entities capable of acting on their own behalf, only living 
<agents> are characterized by the ability to actively make choices to increase the 
probability of their own continuing existence. This ability to persist as highly complex 
organization and to act autonomously is based on the use of energy from the envi-
ronment, as argued by Kauffman and Deacon.  
<Cognition> is living <agency> consisting of all processes that assure living 
agent’s organizational integrity and continuing activity, and it is equivalent with life. 
The dynamics of informational structure leading to new informational structures 
via processes of self-organization of information can be described as morphological 
computing. Consequently, corresponding to distinct layers of structural organization 
found in nature (elementary particles, atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, societies, 
etc.) there are distinct computational processes of self-organization of information 
that implement/realize physical laws. This self-organization is the result of the inter-
actions between different agents/actors as nodes in interaction networks on many 
levels of organization. In this model each type of actors (in themselves informational 
structures) exchange messages of the form specific for their level of organization.  
Finally, as Denning (2007) noticed, computing is nowadays a natural science, and 
it assimilates knowledge from and facilitates development of natural sciences – from 
physics and chemistry to biology, cognitive science and neuroscience. The info-
computational approach can contribute to rethinking cognition as a self-organising 
 bio-chemical process of life, emerging from inorganic matter and evolving spontane-
ously through information self-structuring (morphological computation). Thus we can 
start to learn how to adequately model living systems, which until now have been 
impossible to effectively frame theoretically, simulate and study in their full complex-
ity. (Dodig-Crnkovic & Müller 2011) 
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